FDA FELLOSHIP ADMISSION Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

FDA FELLOSHIP ADMISSION - Essay Example at provided the impetus for my application for the Fellowship Program offered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in conjunction with both personal and professional goals. I share the same mission embodied in FDA’s mission statement, to wit: â€Å"The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, our Nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation. The FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations that make medicines and foods more effective, safer, and more affordable; and helping the public get the accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines and foods to improve their health† (U.S. Food and Drug Adminisration (FDA), 2011, p. 1). The recognition for focusing my professional expertise in the field of public health was actually spurred from my previous volunteer works in HIV prevention and treatment in the city of Aneho in Lome (Togo, West Africa); in child and maternity health in the city of Tsievie in Lome (Togo, West Africa); in imm unization campaign in Aneho, Togo; and through servicing underserved segments of the population. Although sharing the same relevance in serving the needs of health compromised people in the private sector, the field of public health posed greater challenges in terms of trying to be an instrumental contributor to the betterment of the lives of a greater number of people. Likewise, I also realized that in putting my dedicated efforts in public health, I would be serving the needs, not only of my local community, but the medical breakthroughs are cumulatively applicable on a more global scale. I remember clearly that as a child, I had a fair trip in a local community in my country (Cameroon) where I witnessed poverty and need for high quality healthcare provider for the underserved population. The vivid memory nurtured my love

President Barack Obama Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

President Barack Obama - Research Paper Example There is the United States of America.† His inspiring keynote speech appealed to all American’s who longed for politics with a common goal.   Throughout his 2008 presidential campaign, Obama remained true to this premise, promising to ease the partisan divide in Washington D.C.   However, he severely miscalculated the profound division between the political parties, misunderstood the reasons for the division, and assumed, erroneously, that his persuasive powers and political mandate would be enough to overcome it. The genesis of future difficulties began during his campaign. Obama’s overly optimistic message raised expectations so high for that those who voted for him were destined for disappointment.   The enthusiasm his campaign generated proved to be both beneficial and detrimental. While his message rallied many voters,’ especially unprecedented numbers of young persons and minorities encouraging them to anticipate change of a speed and scope that the political system seldom allows.   Following the inauguration the customary checks and balances of Washington were realized along with unexpected and extraordinary opposition of the minority party became apparent the feeling of hope present during the campaign turned into uncertainty and then disillusion. The Democratic Party made tremendous gains in the election of 2008. Barack Obama beat Republican John McCain in the presidential race by an overwhelming margin. Democrats also increased their majorities in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Obama’s won the national popular vote by margin of approximately ten million. â€Å"He has won by the largest margin for a non-incumbent candidate for president since Eisenhower in 1952.† (Fernando, 2011) Essentially, the election result was a mass rejection of George W. Bush administration policies along with the Republican Party’s political platform and effectively ended almost three decades of rule by the right-wing ideology. The

Risk Management In Construction Contracts

Risk Management In Construction Contracts Risk management is vital when tendering for construction contracts. Risk is described by Atkinson (2001) as the probability of an occurrence of a hazard and the magnitude of the consequences. Consequently risk can be considered as the likelihood of an experience occurring and the resultant effect of that experience if it takes place. As defined by RICS (2009) risk management is a means of processes where risks are identified, analysed and managed. It is a constant cycle that begins at the pre-tender stage; this means that risk can be priced into the bid and continues after post contract stage. During the different phases of a project, new risks will emerge throughout the contract. Identifying in advance allows quicker mitigation; to reduce impact risk has on the project. This study has examined the inaccuracy of pre-tender risk management by using both pre-tender and post contract risk registers. As well as risks there were opportunities and these were also recognised in the processes of risk management. This subject area was chosen to be researched after discussion with line managers and work colleagues, during my 2010 placement year with Sir Robert McAlpine (SRM). This topic was considered as an ideal subject area for a research project because SRM were improving their risk management procedures. Therefore the plan of the study was to feedback findings, to further enhance the Tender risk management process. The line manager gave me risk registers for two different project types, and explained how SRM assess risk at all stages of a job. The emphasis being on highway construction, as this information was available from my placement and SRM. 1.2 Rationale The subject of what to research developed from consultations with colleagues and the line manager at SRM. The line manager was involved in risk management and was working to improve SRMs pre-tender risk process to make it replicate the post contract phase. This therefore illustrated a requirement in the business and indeed construction for research in to this topic area. The main reason for eventually electing the subject area of risk was the open access of information provided by SRM and the contact with knowledgeable personnel in my placement. This gave a better understanding of the processes currently used, which allowed me to gain a greater grasp of the subject area. Also access was gained during placement to potential data in the form of contract and tender risk registers from various Highway works undertaken by SRM. The aim, objectives and hypothesis came about from carrying out the literary research, it wasnt until that point that the information was collected, and a plan formulated of how to use it. The research aimed to understand how the pre-tender risk process may be inaccurate. After that considering how it could be improved and whether it was possible to do so. Subsequently, recording any conclusions of pre-tender process in order to develop and better it. 1.3 Aim, Objectives and Hypothesis 1.3.1 Aim To see whether the post contract risk process identifies significant additional risks that the pre-tender risk process failed to identify and thus determine how inaccurate the pre-tender risk process is. 1.3.2 Objectives Identify processes currently used to manage risks at post contract and pre tender stage in recognising and measuring risks. Analyse whether the key additional post contract risks identified were included at pre-tender stage. Compare SRMs risk management processes with other contractors and analyse to find the best solution. If possible, note any resulting conclusions and input results into the pre-tender risk process to produce a new accurate tender risk management. 1.3.3 Hypothesis The post contract risk process in Highway construction successfully identifies additional risks and as a result pre-tender appraisal is inaccurate. 1.4 Overview of work done / Methodology 1.4.1 Literature Review In order to understand the processes used to manage risk in the industry a literary review was embarked on. This meant the research would gain an appreciation of how risk is perceived by the industry, as prior to this my personal experience had only come from SRMs perspective and the processes they use. In order to gain real understanding and to funnel clearly on what my hypothesis stated, it was decided to split the literature review into two sections. One section, comprising of processes used by industry, taken from an assortment of books. The second section being that of SRMs highways process and accompanying documents. This makes it possible for an assessment to be conducted between SRM and the other contractors, so as to gain a better view of how Risk management at different stages of a contract work in Highway works. 1.4.2 SRM Projects The 3 SRM projects looked at were M1 J25-28, A19 upgrade (both Highways Agency) and M74 Glasgow council, they were all Highway maintenance contracts although they differ slightly. A19 was Term Maintenance Contract (TMC) whereas M1 J25-28 and M74 upgrade were (MAC) contracts. When examining the A19 upgrade the contract risk register was acquired but the tender risk register for this contract was not. However the contract risk register for this project was compared with a tender risk register from another contract. Not ideal but the only solution at the time. The majority of the risks are common and on most projects registers, so comparable/related risks were drawn from the tender register, and included in the A19 contract risk register. An evaluation was done involving the contract risk costs, and tender risks. This was done by incorporating the maximum, minimum, most likely costs and the probabilities from contract and tender appraisals. A total assessment for each risk occurred via averaging the maximum, minimum and most likely costs then multiplied by probability of risk occurrence. All risks types were identified, in order to distinguish trends in risks identified at pre-tender stage and found at post-contract stage or were not found at all. The M74 contract risk register was distinctive to M1 J25-28 and A19 upgrade registers as it didnt contain costs. Every risk was divided by its probability and impact, whether that was high, medium or low assessment. Having a pre-tender risk register for this project, meant risks were matched up with the contract risks. Assessing if each risk was covered was done by assigning costs and probabilities to every risk. To find the overall assessment, the probability and cost were multiplied. These costs were then evaluated against the overall pre-tender costs, as with the A19 upgrade. 1.4.3 Interviews Interviews via telephone were conducted with a few companies to really see what processes are used at post contract and pre-tender. Also to find out how precise these methods are. Companies interviewed were: Morgan EST. Vinci Balfour Beatty May Guerney 1.5 Overview of main conclusions The data and analysis carried out imply there is data to sustain in part the hypothesis. This is due to a large number of risks being identified in contract stage that were not previously seen at pre-tender. Even though assessments for any one risk were fairly inaccurate, the overall assessments for pre-tender and post-contract stage were close. Showing that the pre-tender risk process is inaccurate and needed improving if assessments and risk management is to become more reliable. 1.6 Guide to the report Chapter by Chapter overview of report: 1 Introduction An opening on risk management in relation to the project and validates the basis for choosing the subject area. It also states the aims, objectives and hypothesis which the project is established upon, as well as outlining the work done and an overview of the Conclusions. 2 Methodology Explains the methods used to investigate my hypothesis, from Literature review, approaches used data collection, analysis and interpretation of results. This describes the reasons for using the methods chosen and any research boundaries/ limitations. 3 Literature Review This chapter contains my understanding and background reading for the subject area. This was done by, studying the risk process used in management. Allowing a greater comprehension of risk in Highways work, and how its viewed and used. 4 Results and Analysis Confirms the results of the research, and the subsequent analysis for the SRM projects and other contractors interviews. It outlines the assessment made concerning the pre-tender risk register and the post contract risk registers. From this it then cross-examines the data so as to be able to test the hypothesis. 6 Conclusions and Recommendations This analyses all the results in relation to the hypothesis and whether they support it or not. It details any limitations that affected the project, while also imparting proposals for both industry and any future dissertations. 2 Methodology 2.1 Introduction The methodology was vital to the accomplishments of research and was dealt with care in order for the most appropriate research methods to be chosen (Fellows and Liu, 2008). The methodology outcome depended on the subject area, research aims and amount of literature review obtained. For data collection and analysis, the methods employed ought to be realising the aims and objectives so as to continually test the hypothesis and validate the research. The information that was obtainable and available played a huge role, as work on the dissertation could not be done if the information wasnt relevant. The information therefore can be decided by the hypothesis, as if the information is not on hand then one cant trial the hypothesis. Due to these factors, risk management was identified as an appropriate topic from the beginning, but it wasnt until the research was started that defining the hypothesis was possible, yet having an impression of the aims and objectives that were to be accomplished. From the off, the aim was to gauge how precise pre-tender risk management was, even if unsure of the data and information existing prior to consulting SRM team. Ultimately this section highlights the research methods utilised in the research, and the close association that has been made when doing so between the methods and Aim, hypothesis and objectives. 2.2 Aim Employed to help concentrate the methodology in choosing the right methods, also to clarify to the person who reads the dissertation what precisely is being investigated. So this shall be done by recalling the Aim set out: To see whether the post contract risk process identifies key additional risks that the pre-tender risk process failed to identify and thus determine how inaccurate pre-tender risk process is. 2.3 Quantitative and Qualitative methods In Data collection there are two key styles; quantitative and qualitative forms of research. Quantitative being the collection of data measured with figures and analysed with statistical trials in order to to test the hypothesis (Creswell, 1994). While Qualitative research is quite different, it is a method that uses meanings, experiences and descriptions (Naoum, 2007). Quantitative research can be easier to examine as it creates measurable/quantified outcomes that can create analytical arithmetical results. While, qualitative information from research has a tendency to be complicated as it often requires researcher input and manipulation to ensure its appropriate for investigative procedures (Fellows and Liu, 2008). The research methods depend on the information obtainable and the aim of the research. In carrying out good piece of research, its generally required and essential to use both quantitative and qualitative. A combination of methods was used, to enable the correct and more reliable conclusions; more is detailed further in this section. 2.4 Literature Review A literature review was undertaken; to provide the core subject knowledge of risk management in construction. The idea was to comprehend how risk is analysed in the construction sector, and the procedures used in controlling it. Next research was done to discover how risk is managed, by using literature in form of books and journals. Then see SRMs risk management process from their risk management documentation. Dividing the literature review in two sections meant that one of the objectives could be fulfilled by comparing SRMs risk management approach with other construction companies. Overall the literature review gave a greater understanding of the chosen topic of risk, and illustrated the problems and successes in risk management. While also showing the diverse and numerous ways in managing risk, and how the approach identified and selected can depend on many factors such as project size, contract used and size of companies involved in the managing of the project. The list literature sources below were used in delivering the dissertation: Textbooks -were very useful in gaining the relevant knowledge of risk management, and procedures used. Books were found by searching Loughborough Universitys library database. Chapters needed or thought appropriate were studied, and compared against searches that had been made on the internet. A check system, which assessed the validity of both sources of information against each other. With much of the research it became apparent that information in books available werent current especially in the older series of books. Despite this it wasnt a predicament for Risk management as texts of up to ten years old were and are significant and applicable now, with some techniques having improved. The books allowed for great comparison for up to date information on the internet. Journals were again located on the Loughborough University library database, which with the relevant buzz words located material of use. Finding journals proved difficult in comparison to textbook numbers, yet the sources were helpful. Internet supplied a platform for research of literature. Being easy to use and handy, collating information could be done at speed and with relative ease. It allowed greater understanding of what type of book would be needed from the library. Information from the internet was important but it had its limits and it was vital to know that it can be inaccurate and cause misguidance, research can be more guaranteed with text and journals. This way of thinking about limitations in using the internet was in mind when searching websites on risk in the construction. Finding various helpful websites any information was compared other websites in order to increase reliability, but most importantly against book and journals. As with all research appropriate sources of reliability were identified and used like the RICS website. Two editorials from RICS site provided constructive, and were used in the literature review. In finding books the internet was most useful as many articles on websites h ighlighted book of particular relevance and use. SRMs Risk Management Procedures document SRMs risk management procedure document was used as section two of the literature review. Reading through the document and important information was used in the literature review, particularly, on the processes used by SRM in risk management. A comparison was made between SRMs procedures and with those found in the first half of the literature review. 2.5 Data Collection When actually collecting the data for the research the collection was again split into two parts. The initial data collection was from SRM projects, other data collection was associated to other contractors. The intention was to compare the risk procedures, and attempt at analysing which was the superior one. The next section shows how all the data collection was collected and prepared. 2.5.1 SRM Projects The data for SRM projects was collected during a placement year, when working in the relevant packages and job roles. Prior to any data collection, discussions with line managers and seniors took place in order to help formulate and aid the research as what would be required in terms of data. At this stage no hypothesis had been decided, the idea was to assess the accuracy of pre-tender risk assessments. It was therefore recommended that the applicable information in the form pre-tender and post contract risk registers could be provided. The contracts that would be made available were the M1 J25-28 scheme, A19 upgrade and M74 Glasgow project. Three similar Motorway/road maintenance projects that differ from each other contractually. A19 upgrade is a TMC to maintain, operate a network of strategic roads in the North East. M1 J25-28 and M74 are both MAC contracts for similar maintenance one in the midlands and the latter in Glasgow. A19 upgrade and M1 J25-28 are HA run, while M74 is for the Glasgow city council. The HA run their contracts by splitting their contracts into 13 sections in the UK, and in these projects cases offer for the extension and maintenance of the roads within these sections. The reason that A19 upgrade was a TMC but M1 J25-28 and M74 MAC contracts is previous to the MAC HA projects were also run with the TMC contract, but now all is done under MAC style. The contracts run for 5 years with optional extensions. Different sections of maintenance start and end at different areas on the motorway in question over a 5 year cycle, meaning that when MAC contracts were first used, some sections werent using them and using TMC etc A19 upgrade was a TMCs completed in 2009, whereas M1 J25-28 scheme was a mew MAC contracts just seeing completion in late 2010. The difference in TMCs and MAC contracts is TMCs two separate companies, one as managing agent the other as main contractor. MAC contracts are one company, who runs as both the contractor and managing agent. Using the three contracts as the basis for the research the risk manager on the placement at SRM started off by providing a tender risk register for the M1 J25-28 and A19 contract, projects he had involvement on. Trying to find tender risk registers for M74 was problematic but couldnt find any. In order to have a full complete analysis, it was decided that for M74 to use another MAC contract tender risk register. This was exactly the same as M74 except the location geographically. For sure this would create limitations but it was decided, it would possible to use the risk register as SRM tend to re-use the risk register from preceding bids for specific contracts. So similarities would be high and that as long as it was noted in the dissertation as to its use and reasons why. Due to the generic nature of the risks they were deemed suitable as with what SRM do in practice. While on placement working on the M1 J25-28 contract meant developing contacts with people in the relevant field of risk management. Therefore requesting the use of the risk register on M1 job was easier than the other projects. The A19 contract risk register was also obtained contracts at work so. Finally also getting the M74 contract risk register, because although never having worked on this contract the line manager on my placement gave contact details of relevant personnel to enquire with and the registers were duly emailed. 2.5.2 Other Contractors Obtaining data via contractors in the sector of road maintenance was much more difficult than from SRM sources, as they were very protective of information they gave out. All the projects obtained so far from SRM contracts were Highways related, so the focus was on trying to collect data from Highway contractors. By doing this it would allow for a honest comparison between SRM and other contractors. Processes to manage risk are expected to be similar involving different construction projects; the data was likely to be different. The plan was to send questionnaires to the chosen contractors, but after unsuccessful returns it became apparent that another route would be needed, so interviews via telephone were deemed suitable. It seemed with written questionnaires, companies were more likely to ignore them, whereas on the phone they would respond to the questions asked immediately, with no real confusion of what the question was asking as myself in person could explain. The Highway contractors contacted were: Morgan est. Vinci Balfour Beatty May Guerney A semi-structured set of questions was planned in order to gain the information required but also allowed telephone participant to elaborate and discuss the subject in a friendly professional manner. Contractors in Highways works were contacted, the dissertation of Risk Management was explained with the aims and objectives that needed to be achieved and the following questions were asked: Do you have a pre-tender risk management method? How do you detect risks in the pre-tender phase? How do you calculate risks to arrive at a total risk pot? Do you undertake risk management post-contract phase? Could I obtain a pre-tender risk analysis and post contract risk analysis for my research use (for the Highways project you are on)? To each conversation it was explained that my aim was; compare the risks types at tender stage with contract stage as well as assessments made. The questions were supposed to identify the processes companies used in managing risks. Overall the different companies were helpful in answering these questions. The Fifth and final question was done to get registers like that gained from SRM. It was the only difficult part as many refused to hand registers over from live projects due to the sensitivity of their data and company policies. However some registers were received but didnt really contain the crucial information required just a formatted company risk register. Throughout the interviews, notes were made on the first four questions and the results put into a table at the time of the interview showing the company and their response to each question. Thus, making analysis easier when looking at the responses later in the dissertation. 2.6 Data Analysis Prior to data analysis, the research had assessed how SRM price risks because of the literature review and looking at the risk registers. It was crucial to identify this before undertaking the data analysis as it established what type of analysis would be carried out, and therefore detailed below. Upon formulating the risks that have been identified each risk will be categorised with minimum, maximum, most likely value and probability. Done for all of the risks, the information is put into a piece of simulation software called @ RISK which does hundreds to thousands of simulations, and creates a graph with a bell-shaped curve. The 75th percentile is put in the bid as the risk potential. SRM do this for all of their projects. For this dissertation we were concerned in the risks were identified and the individual costing of each risk as shown in paragraph above with min, max etc. The focal point being what was keyed in to @ RISK as opposed to what it produces. For the Data analysis the SRM contracts have been split into their individual projects and the Other Highway contractors. The reason for splitting the SRMs projects is that the analysis varied in parts by way it had been collected as mentioned earlier (some with full risk registers some in part). 2.6.1 M1 J25-28s scheme and M74 Glasgow Analysis for M1 and M74 projects were pretty much the same. The M1 contract and tender risk register could be compared with the contract and tender risk register for the M74 contract, due to them both being Macs. To evaluate the accuracy of the risk assessments, comparable risks to the contract register, were removed from the tender register, put against the matching risk in the contract register. When comparing values in matching risks, it was vital to have a total cost for risks in both the contract and pre-tender register. The best and most impartial way to do this for the pre-tender risk register was to take the average from the maximum, minimum and most likely figures and multiply the probability. The maximum, minimum and most likely values are the range of potential expenses that could be incurred by the risk, and any total cost was decided to be an average of these, as all projects had them. As its unknown as to its actually occurrence the average should be multiplied by the probability, which gives a total potential cost to the risk. While the contract risk registers should be considered by severity and possibility by scale of 1-5, and then an assessment of the risk is undertaken, figuring out the minimum, maximum and most likely values of each risk. Mitigation measures are identified for each risk, and then assessment is done again as before the mitigation. The M74 contract risk register did not have minimum cost of the risks, so all risks were assumed to be zero. Without any minimum values any overall assessments of the risk would not have been made. The reason for not using the likely value instead was so the data would use a range of values. It was decided greater accuracy would be found in setting the minimum as zero and range of values than the most likely. By setting all its risks as zero means they are an unimportant minimum value or a risk/event that doesnt happen. The M1 contract register had all the necessary values so no intervention was needed. Both contract risk registers failed to show any probability, just a likelihood scale from 1-5. Therefore it was assumed, giving the scale a percentage as would normally be done: 1 10% 2 30% 3 50% 4 70% 5 90% These percentages were used because they provided a suitable range, as risks with low likelihoods (1) are unlikely to occur but not impossible so 10% seemed a reasonable percentage. Similarly 90% seemed a reasonable percentage for high likelihoods (5) as they are likely to occur but not certain. The other values were then evenly distributed between 10% and 90%. Having made these assumptions the overall assessment for contract risks was made in the same way as the tender risks, finding the average of the maximum, minimum and most likely and multiplying this by the probability. Where the same tender risk was identified as being applicable to more than one contract risk the overall assessment was divided by the number of contract risks it was applicable to. This was because when these values were totalled there would be double counting of these tender risks if this was not done. To show this information a table was created showing; a list of contract risks, the corresponding tender risks, raw data inputted into the risk registers, and the overall assessments. I then split the contract risks into one of the following categories: Not identified but covered (No cost). Not identified and not covered should be identified. Not identified cannot be identified. Identified and covered. Identified but not covered. Each risk was grouped by colour to state which category from above it fell in. 2.6.2 A19 upgrade The analysis for the A19 contract was started off in the same way as had been done for the M1 J25-28 and M74 contracts, going through the contract risk register and identifying any similar risks from the tender risk register. The assessments for the overall cost for the tender risks were made in exactly the same way, by taking the average of the maximum, minimum and most likely values and multiplying this by the probability. This was because the tender risk registers were in exactly the same format. However the differences came when the assessments of the overall cost for the contract risks were made. This was because for this project, the contract risk register assessed the risks in a different way to the Area 6 and Area 13 contract risk registers. This difference was that there were no costs in the A19 risk register. Instead the risks identified at contract stage were assessed in terms of likelihood and impact on a scale of high, medium and low. This meant that assessing the overall cost for the contract risks were harder because there was no costs given. Therefore the only way to assess the overall cost of the risk was to give the risk a cost and a probability based on whether it was high, medium or low and then multiply these two figures together. This means that deciding what costs and probabilities to assign to each level of risk was important, as the overall assessment was dependent upon these assumptions. In terms of what costs to give for each level of impact, the risk matrix that SRM use for prioritising risks was referred to. They assess the impact and probability of each risk using a 1-5 scale and they give the parameters for impact as being: 1 under  £1,000 2  £1,000  £10,000 3  £10,000  £100,000 4  £100,000  £1,000,000 5 Over  £1,000,000 As this was a 1-5 scale and the risks and the contract risks were only divided into high medium and low, the figures for 1 and 5 was as too extreme both ways. For low risks I decided to take the high point of a risk impact of 2 ( £10,000) and for high risks I took the low point of a risk impact of 4 ( £100,000). For medium risks I took the midpoint between these two values ( £55,000). Using these figures seemed reasonable based upon this scale, as it created enough of a range without a too big range. For the probabilities, the likelihood scale they use was based on descriptions rather than probabilities. From knowledge in research the probabilities for low were set at 10%, medium risks 50% and high risks 90%. These percentages were used because they provided a suitable range, as risks with low likelihoods are unlikely to occur but not impossible, so 10% seemed a reasonable percentage. Similarly 90% seemed a reasonable percentage for high risks, as they are likely to occur but not certain. For medium risks the midpoint between these two percentages (50%) was used, because they are possible to occur. The cost was then multiplied by the probability to give an overall value for each risk. Following this, the rest of my analysis was exactly the same as the M1 J25-28 and M74 contracts 2.6.3 Further Analysis Explanation This section so far details how the risk registers were compared, which was the first step in terms of analysing the data, and these tables are included in the appendices at the end of this dissertation. However on there own, these tables did not give sufficient information to be able to test my hypothesis. Firstly, to interrogate how accurate the identification of the risks was, the risks that were identified, and were not identified and not commercially covered, were filtered out, and lists were made of these risks. As this was done, each risk was put into a category to see if there were particular categories that are, and are not identified at tender stage. To analyse this, tables were created for risks identified and not identified, detailing the categories of risks, and the number of risks in each category. From these tables, two pie charts were drawn to show this information graphically. To analyse the assessment of the risks, a summary table was firstly drawn to show the number of contract risks in the following categories, and the total assessments relating to these risks: Not identified but covered (No cost). Not identified and not covered should be identified. Not identified cannot be identified. Identified and covered.

United Nations :: Free Essays

Describe the goal and functions of the United Nations. Upon the conclus5ion of WWII, the 1945 San Francisco Conference created the provisions for the United Nations. The purpose of this multinational organization was to promote international peace and security, settlement of disputes between nations by peaceful means, develop friendly relations with other nations, and the international cooperation to solve global social, economic, and cultural problems. To accomplish this agenda, the United Nations is divided into six departments, all having their own specific duties.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The U.N. charter gave the Security Council the responsibility dealing with threats to our international peace and security. There are five permanent members on the board and they include China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the U.S.. Each member carries veto power over other the member’s actions. There are also ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly. These ten members serve a two-year term to ensure that various populations are represented on a rotating basis.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The General Assembly includes all voting eligible nations. This assembly meets to discuss and make recommendations concerning world problems. Africa makes up 33% of total membership and can have a tremendous influence on the resolution process.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The Secretariat is sort of the grunt or laborer in the organization. They are responsible for the day to day operations, calls conferences and meetings, and distributes information to the other departments as well as the public.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The U.N. Secretary General serves as a look-out. This part of the organization is to inform the Security Councils attention to direct or possible threats towards our world peace. The Secretary general also may undertake special missions and command emergency forces.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The Economic and Social Council coordinates the activities of specific agencies. It is their responsibly to is make sure each department is running smooth and in the right direction.

Nodding Ethics of Care and the Four Standard Essay

Ethics is a study of human conduct in relation to his moral principles. These moral principles may be regarded as the behavior or conducts that human psychology has adopted or the way on which the obligations and specific duties of the society demands from its members. (Carol, 1982) The ethics of care is an ethical theory that to talk about what makes an action right or wrong. These theories were developed by feminists during the late 20th century. According to these theories, while the deontological and consequentiality theories emphasize on the importance of universal importability, ethics on the other hand emphasize on the importance of relationship. (Bartky, 1990) Nel Noddings Nel Nodding was an American feminist and educationist who was famously known for her work in philosophy, ethical care as well as her educational theories. She emphasized on the basics of ethical theories and their recognition. (Sarah, 1990) She was in much advocacy of the independence of people in achieving their interest and those that are vulnerable to our choices as well as their outcomes needs extra consideration and would be determined by measuring through 1) the level of the vulnerability depending to one’s choice and 2) how much it would affect one’s choice The most important reason for this theory is safeguarding and promoting one’s interest. (Dewey, 1993) Reference: Bartky, S. 1990: Femininity and Domination, page 104-5. Routledge, New York Carol, G, 1982: â€Å"In a Different Voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. † Cambridge, Harvard University Press Dewey, J. 1993: Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief. New York: Teachers College Press Sarah, L. 1990 ‘Some Concerns about Nel Noddings’ Caring’. Hypatia 5 (1),

EMI and the CT Scanner Essay

In early 1972 there was considerable disagreement among top management at EMI Ltd, the UKbased music, electronics, and leisure company. The subject of the controversy was the CT scanner, a new medical diagnostic imaging device that had been developed by the group’s Central Research Laboratory (CRL). At issue was the decision to enter this new business, thereby launching a diversification move that many felt was necessary if the company was to continue to prosper. Complicating the problem was the fact that this revolutionary new product would not only take EMI into the fast-changing and highly competitive medical equipment business, but would also require the company to establish operations in North America, a market in which it had no prior experience. In March 1972 EMI’s board was considering an investment proposal for  £6 million to build CT scanner manufacturing facilities in the United Kingdom. Development of the CT Scanner company background and history EMI Ltd traces its origins back to 1898, when the Gramophone Company was founded to import records and gramophones from the United States. It soon established its own manufacturing and recording capabilities, and after a 1931 merger with its major rival, the Columbia Gramophone Company, emerged as the Electric and Musical Industries, Ltd. EMI Ltd quickly earned a reputation as an aggressive technological innovator, developing the automatic record changer, stereophonic records, magnetic recording tape, and the pioneer commercial television system adopted by the BBC in 1937. Beginning in 1939, EMI’s R&D capabilities were redirected by the war effort toward the development of fuses, airborne radar, and other sophisticated  electronic devices. The company emerged from the war with an electronics business, largely geared to defenserelated products, as well as its traditional entertainment businesses. The transition to peacetime was particularly difficult for the electronics division, and its poor performance led to attempts to pursue new industrial and consumer applications. EMI did some exciting pioneering work, and for a while held hopes of being Britain’s leading computer company. Market leadership in major electronics applications remained elusive, however, while the music business boomed. The 1955 acquisition of Capitol Records in the United States, and the subsequent success of the Beatles and other recording groups under contract to EMI, put the company in a very strong financial position as it entered the 1970s. In 1970 the company h ad earned  £21 million before tax on sales of  £215 million, and although extraordinary losses halved those profits in 1971, the company was optimistic for a return to previous profit levels in 1972 (see exhibits 10.1 to 10.3 for EMI’s financial performance). Around that time, a change in top management signaled a change in corporate strategy. John Read, an accountant by training and previously sales director for Ford of Great Britain, was appointed chief executive officer after only four years in the company. Read recognized the risky, even fickle, nature of the music business, which accounted for two-thirds of EMI’s sales and profits. In an effort to change the company’s strategic balance, he began to divert some of its substantial cash flow into numerous acquisitions and internal developments. To encourage internal innovation, Read established a research fund that was to be used to finance innovative developments outside the company’s immediate interests. Among the first projects financed was one proposed by Godfrey Hounsfield, a research scientist in EMI’s Central Research Laboratories (CRL). Hounsfield’s proposal opened up an opportunity for the company to diversify in the fast-growing medical electronics field. ct scanning: the concept In simple terms, Hounsfield’s research proposal was to study the possibility of creating a threedimensional image of an object by taking multiple X-ray measurements of the object from different angles, then using a computer to reconstruct a picture from the data contained in hundreds of overlapping and  intersecting X-ray slices. The concept became known as computerized tomography (CT). Although computerized tomography represented a conceptual breakthrough, the technologies it harnessed were quite well known and understood. Essentially, it linked X-ray, data processing, and cathode ray tube display technologies in a complex and precise manner. The real development challenge consisted of integrating the mechanical, electronic, and radiographic components into an accurate, reliable, and sensitive system. Figure 10.1 provides a schematic representation of the EMI scanner, illustrating the linkage of the three technologies, as well as the patient handling table and X-ray gantry. Progress was rapid, and clinical trials of the CT scanner were under way by late 1970. To capture the image of multiple slices of the brain, the scanner went through a translate-rotate sequence, as illustrated in figure 10.2. The X-ray source and detector, located on opposite sides of the patient’s head, were mounted on a gantry. After each scan, or â€Å"translation,† had generated an X-ray image comprising 160 data points, the gantry would rotate 1 ° and another scan would be made. This procedure would continue through 180 translations and rotations, storing a total of almost 30,000 data points. Since the detected intensity of an X-ray varies with the material through which it passes, the data could be reconstructed by the computer into a threedimensional image of the object that distinguished bone, tissue, water, fat, and so on. At about the time of the CT clinical trials, John Powell, formerly managing director of Texas Instrument’s English subsidiary, joined EMI as technical director. He soon became convinced that the poor profitability of the nonmilitary electronics business was due to the diffusion of the company’s 2,500-person R&D capability over too many diverse small-volume lines. In his words, â€Å"EMI was devoted to too many products and dedicated to too few.† Because the CT scanner project built on the company’s substantial and well-established electronics capability, Powell believed it gave EMI an important opportunity t o enter an exciting new field. He felt that this was exactly the type of effort in which the company should be prepared to invest several million  pounds. Diagnostic Imaging Industry During the first half of the twentieth century, diagnostic information about internal organs and functions was provided almost exclusively by conventional X-ray examination, but in the 1960s hostemostel.com and 1970s, several new imaging techniques emerged. When the CT scanner was announced, three other important technologies existed: X-ray, nuclear, and ultrasound. EMI management believed its CT scanner would displace existing diagnostic imaging equipment in only a few applications, specifically head and brain imaging. x-ray In 1895 Wilhelm Roentgen discovered that rays generated by a cathode ray tube could penetrate solid objects and create an image on film. Over the next 40 to 50 years, X-ray equipment was installed in almost every healthcare facility in the world. Despite its several limitations (primarily due to the fact that detail was obscured when three-dimensional features were superimposed on a two-dimensional image), X-rays were universally used. In 1966 a Surgeon General’s report estimated that between one-third and one-half of all crucial medical decisions in the United States depended on interpretation of X-ray films. That country alone had more than 80,000 X-ray installations in operation, performing almost 150 million procedures in 1970. The X-ray market was dominated by five major global companies. Siemens of West Germany was estimated to have 22 percent of the world market, N.V. Philips of the Netherlands had 18 percent, and Compagnie Generale de Radiologie (CGE), subsidiary of th e French giant Thomson Brandt, held 16 percent. Although General Electric had an estimated 30 percent of the large US market, its weak position abroad gave it only 15 percent of the world market. The fifth largest company was Picker, with 20 percent of the US market, but less than 12 percent worldwide. The size of the US market for X-ray equipment was estimated at $350 million  in 1972, with an additional $350 million in X-ray supplies. The United States was thought to represent 35– 40% of the world market. Despite the maturity of the product, the X-ray market was growing by almost 10% annually in dollar terms during the early 1970s. A conventional X-ray system represented a major capital expenditure for a hospital, with the average system costing more than $100,000 in 1973. In the mid-1960s a nuclear diagnostic imaging procedure was developed. Radioisotopes with a short radioactive life were projected into the body, detected and monitored on a screen, then recorded on film or stored on a tape. Still in an early stage of development, this technology was used to complement or, in some instances, replace a conventional X-ray diagnosis. Both static and dynamic images could be obtained. Following the pioneering development of this field by Nuclear-Chicago, which sold the first nuclear gamma camera in 1962, several other small competitors had entered the field, notably Ohio Nuclear. By the late 1960s larger companies such as Picker were getting involved, and in 1971 GE’s Medical Systems Division announced plans to enter the nuclear medicine field. As new competitors, large and small, entered the market, competition became more aggressive. The average nuclear camera and data processing system sold for about $75,000. By 1973, shipments of nuclear imaging equipment into the US market were estimated to be over $50 million. Ultrasound had been used in medical diagnosis since the 1950s, and the technology advanced significantly in the early 1970s, permitting better-defined images. The technique involves transmitting sonic waves and picking up the echoes, which when converted to electric energy  could create images. Air and bone often provide an acoustic barrier, limiting the use of this technique. But because the patient was not exposed  to radiation, it was widely used as a diagnostic tool in obstetrics and gynecology. In 1973 the ultrasound market was very small, and only a few small companies were reported in the field. Picker, however, was rumored to be doing research in the area. The cost of the equipment was expected to be less than half that of a nuclear camera and support system, and perhaps a third to a quarter that of an X-ray machine. Because of its size, sophistication, progressiveness, and access to funds, the US medical market clearly represented the major opportunity for a new device such as the CT scanner. EMI management was uncertain about the sales potential for their new product, however. As of 1972, there were around 7,000 hospitals in the United States, ranging from tiny rural hospitals with fewer than 10 beds to giant teaching institutions with 1,000 beds or more (see table 10.1). Since the price of the EMI Scanner was expected to be around $400,000, only the largest and financially strongest short-term institutions would be able to afford one. But the company was encouraged by the enthusiasm of the physicians who had seen and worked with the scanner. In the opinion of one leading American neurologist, at least 170 machines would be required by major US hospitals. Indeed, he speculated, the time might come when a neurologist would feel ethically compelled to order a CT scan before making a diagnosis. During the 1960s the radiology departments in many hospitals were recognized as important money-making operations. Increasingly, radiologists were able to commission equipment manufacturers to build specially designed (often esoteric) X-ray systems and applications. As their budgets expanded, the size of the US X-ray market grew from $50 million in 1958 to $350 million in 1972. Of the 15,000 radiologists in the United States, 60 percent were primarily based in offices and 40 percent in hospitals. Little penetration of private clinics was foreseen for the CT scanner. Apart from these broad statistics, EMI had little ability to forecast the potential of the US market for scanners. EMI’s Investment Decision conflicting management views By late 1971 it was clear that the clinical trials were successful and EMI management had to decide whether to make the investment required to develop the CT scanner business. One group of senior managers felt that direct EMI participation was undesirable for three reasons. First, EMI lacked medical product experience. In the early 1970s EMI offered only two very small medical products, a patient-monitoring device and an infrared thermography device, which together represented less than 0.5 percent of the company’s sales. Second, they argued that the manufacturing process would be quite different from EMI’s experience. Most of its electronics work had been in the job shop mode required in producing small numbers of highly specialized defense products on cost-plus government contracts. In scanner production, most of the components were purchased from subcontractors and had to be integrated into a functioning system. Finally, many believed that without a working knowledge of the North American market, where most of the demand for scanners was expected to be, EMI might find it very difficult to build an effective operation from scratch. Among the strongest opponents of EMI’s self-development of this new business was one of the scanner’s earliest sponsors, Dr Broadway, head of the Central Research Laboratory. He emphasized that EMI’s potential competitors in the field had considerably greater technical capabilities and resources. As the major proponent, John Powell needed convincing market information to counter the critics. In early 1972 he asked some of the senior managers how many scanners they thought the company would sell in its first 12 months. Their first estimate was five. Powell told them to think again. They came back with a figure of 12, and were again sent back to reconsider. Finally, with an estimate of 50, Powell felt he could go to bat for the  £6 million  investment, since at this sales level he could project handsome profits from year one. He then prepared an argument that justified the scanner’s fit with EMI’s overall objectives, and outlined a basic strategy for the business. Powell argued that self-development of the CT scanner represented just the sort of vehicle EMI had been seeking to provide some focus to its development effort. By definition, diversification away from existing product-market areas would move the company into somewhat unfamiliar territory, but he firmly believed that the financial and strategic payoffs would be huge. The product offered access to global markets and an entry into the lucrative medical equipment field. He felt the company’s objective should be to achieve a substantial share of the world medical electronics business not only in diagnostic imaging, but also through the extension of its technologies into computerized patient planning and radiation therapy. Powell claimed that the expertise developed by Hounsfield and his team, coupled with protection from patents, would give EMI three or four years, and maybe many more, to establish a solid market position. He argued that investments should be made quickly and boldly to maximize the market share of the EMI scanner before competitors entered. Other options, such as licensing, would impede the development of the scanner. If the licensees were the major Xray equipment suppliers, they might not promote the scanner aggressively since it would cannibalize their sales of X-ray equipment and consumables. Smaller companies would lack EMI’s sense of commitment and urgency. Besides, licensing would not provide EMI with the major strategic diversification it was seeking. It would be, in Powell’s words, â€Å"selling our birthright.† the proposed strategy Because the CT scanner incorporated a complex integration of some technologies in which EMI had only limited expertise, Powell proposed that the manufacturing strategy should rely heavily on outside sources of those components rather than trying to develop the expertise internally. This approach would not only minimize risk, but would also make it possible to implement a manufacturing program rapidly. He proposed the concept of developing various â€Å"centers of excellence† both inside and outside the company, making each responsible for the continued superiority of the subsystem it manufactured. For example, within the EMI UK organization a unit called SE Labs, which manufactured instruments and displays, would become the center of excellence for the scanner’s viewing console and display control. Pantak, an EMI unit with a capability in X-ray tube assembly, would become the center of excellence for the X-ray generation and detection subsystem. An outside vendor with which the company had worked in developing the scanner would be the center of excellence for data processing. Finally, a newly created division would be responsible for coordinating these subsystem manufacturers, integrating the various components, and assembling the final scanner at a company facility in the town of Hayes, not far from the CRL site. Powell emphasized that the low initial investment was possible because most of the components and subsystems were purchased from contractors and vendors. Even internal centers of excellence such as SE Labs and Pantak assembled their subsystems from purchased components. Overall, outside vendors accounted for 75–80 percent of the scanner’s manufacturing cost. Although Powell felt his arrangement greatly reduced EMI’s risk, the  £6 hostemostel.com million investment was a substantial one for the company, representing about half the funds available for capital investment over the coming year. (See exhibit 10.2 for a balance sheet and exhibit 10.3 for a projected funds flow.) The technology strategy was to keep CRL as the company’s center of excellence for design and software expertise, and to use the substantial profits Powell was projecting from even the earliest sales to maintain technological leadership position. Powell would personally head up a team to develop a marketing strategy. Clearly, the United States had to be the main focus of EMI’s marketing activity. Its neuroradiologists were regarded as world leaders and tended to welcome technological innovation. Furthermore, its  institutions were more commercial in their outlook than those in other countries and tended to have more available funds. Powell planned to set up a US sales subsidiary as soon as possible, recruiting sales and service personnel familiar with the North American healthcare market. Given the interest shown to date in the EMI scanner, he did not think there would be much difficulty in gaining the attention and interest of the medical community. Getting the $400,0 00 orders, however, would be more of a challenge. In simple terms, Powell’s sales strategy was to get machines into a few prestigious reference hospitals, then build from that base. the decision In March 1972 EMI’s chief executive, John Read, considered Powell’s proposal in preparation for a board meeting. Was this the diversification opportunity he had been hoping for? What were the risks? Could they be managed? How? If he decided to back the proposal, what kind of an implementation program would be necessary to ensure its eventual success? CASE B The year 1977 looked like it would be a very good one for EMI Medical Inc., a North American subsidiary of EMI Ltd. EMI’s CT scanner had met with enormous success in the American market. In the three years since the scanner’s introduction, EMI medical electronics sales had grown to  £42 million. Although this represented only 6 percent of total sales, this new business contributed pretax profits of  £12.5 million, almost 20 percent of the corporate total (exhibit 10.4). EMI Medical Inc. was thought to be responsible for about 80 percent of total scanner volume. And with an order backlog of more than 300 units, the future seemed rosy. Despite this formidable success, senior management in both the subsidiary and the parent company were concerned about several developments. First, this fast-growth field had attracted more than a dozen new entrants in the past two years, and technological advances were occurring rapidly. At the same time, the growing political debate ov er hospital cost containment often focused on $500,000 CT scanners as an example of questionable hospital spending. Finally, EMI was beginning to feel some internal organizational strains. Entry Decision  product launch Following months of debate among EMI’s top management, the decision to go ahead with the EMI Scanner project was assured when John Read, the company CEO, gave his support to Dr Powell’s proposal. In April 1972 a formal press announcement was greeted by a response that could only be described as overwhelming. EMI was flooded with inquiries from the medical and financial communities, and from most of the large diagnostic imaging companies wanting to license the technology, enter into joint ventures, or at least distribute the product. The response was that the company had decided to enter the business directly itself. Immediately action was implemented to put Dr Powell’s manufacturing strategy into operation. Manufacturing facilities were developed and supply contracts drawn up with the objective of beginning shipments within 12 months. In May, Godfrey Hounsfield, the brilliant EMI scientist who had developed the scanner, was dispatched to the US accompanied by a leading English neurologist. The American specialists with whom they spoke confirmed that the scanner had great medical importance. Interest was running high in the medical community. In December, EMI mounted a display at the annual meeting of the Radiological Society of North America (RSNA). The exhibit was the highlight of the show, and boosted management’s confidence to establish a US sales company to penetrate the American medical market. us market entry In June 1973, with an impressive pile of sales leads and inquiries, a small sales office was established in Reston, Virginia, home of the newly appointed US sales branch manager, Mr Gus Pyber. Earlier that month the first North American head scanner had been installed at the prestigious Mayo Clinic, with a second machine promised to the Massachusetts General Hospital for trials. Interest was high, and the new sales force had little difficulty getting into the offices of leading radiologists and neurologists. By the end of the year, however, Mr Pyber had been fired in a dispute over appropriate expense levels, and James Gallagher, a former marketing manager with a major drug company, was hired to replace him. One of Gallagher’s first steps was to convince the company that the Chicago area was a far better location for the US office. It allowed better servicing of a national market, was a major center for medical electronics companies, and had more convenient linkages with London. This last point was important since all major strategic and policy decisions were being made directly by Dr Powell in London. During 1974, Gallagher concentrated on recruiting and developing his three-man sales force and two-man service organization. The cost of maintaining each salesman on the road was estimated at $50,000, while a serviceman’s salary and expenses at that time were around $35,000 annually. The production rate for the scanner was running at a rate of only three or four machines a month, and Gallagher saw little point in developing a huge sales force to sell a product for which supply was limited, and interest seemingly boundless. In this seller’s market the company developed some policies that were new to the industry. Most notably, they required that the customer deposit one-third of the purchase price with the order to guarantee a place in the production schedule. Sales leads and enquiries were followed up when the sales force could get to them, and the general attitude of the company seemed to have somewhat of a â€Å"take it or leave it† tone. It was in this period that EMI developed a reputation for arrogance in some parts of the medical profession. Nonetheless, by June 1974 the company had delivered 35 scanners at $390,000 each, and had another 60 orders in hand. Developing Challenges competitive challenge Toward the end of 1974, the first competitive scanners were announced. Unlike the EMI scanner, the new machines were designed to scan the body rather than the head. The Acta- Scanner had been developed at Georgetown University’s Medical Center and was manufactured by a small Maryland company called Digital Information Sciences  Corporation (DISCO). Technologically, it offered little advance over the EMI scanner except for one important feature. Its gantry design would accommodate a body rather than a head. While specifications on scan time and image composition were identical to those of the EMI scanner, the $298,000 price tag gave the Acta-Scanner a big advantage, particularly with smaller hospitals and private practitioners. The DeltaScan offered by Ohio Nuclear (ON) represented an even more formidable challenge. This head and body scanner had 256 ∞ 256 pixels compared with EMI’s 160 ∞ 160, and promised a 21/2-minute scan rather than the 41/2-minute scan time offered by EMI. ON offered these superior features on a unit priced $5,000 below the EMI scanner at $385,000. Many managers at EMI were surprised by the speed with which these products had appeared, barely two years after the EMI scanner was exhibited at the RSNA meeting in Chicago, and 18 months after the first machine was installed in the Mayo Clinic. The source of the challenge was also interesting. DISCO was a tiny private company, and ON contributed about 20 percent of its parent Technicare’s 1974 sales of $50 million. To some, the biggest surprise was how closely these competitive machines resembled EMI’s own scanner. The complex wall of patents had not provided a very enduring defense. ON tackled the issue directly in its 1975 annual report. After announcing that $882,200 had been spent in Technicare’s R&D Center to develop DeltaScan, the report stated: Patents have not played a significant role in the development of Ohio Nuclear’s product line, and it is not believed that the validity or invalidity of any patents known to exist is material to its current market position. However, the technologies on which its products are based are sufficiently complex and application of patent law sufficiently indefinite that this belief is not free from all doubt. The challenge represented by these new competitive products caused EMI to speed up the announcement of the body scanner Dr Hounsfield had been working on. The new CT 5000 model incorporated a second-generation technology in which multiple beams of radiation were shot at multiple detectors, rather  than the single pencil beam and the single detector of the original scanner (see exhibit 10.5). This technique allowed the gantry to rotate 10 ° rather than l ° after each translation, cutting scan time from 41/2 minutes to 20 seconds. In addition, the multiple-beam emission also permitted a finer image resolution by increasing the number of pixels from 160 ∞ 160 to 320 ∞ 320. Priced over $500,000, the CT 5000 received a standing ovation when Hounsfield demonstrated it at the radiological meetings held in Bermuda in May 1975. Despite EMI’s reassertion of its leadership position, aggressive competitive activity continued. In March 1975, Pfizer Inc., the $1.5 billion drug giant, announced it had acquired the manufacturing and marketing rights for the Acta-Scanner. EMI was then operating at an annual production rate of 150 units, and ON had announced plans to double capacity to 12 units per month by early 1976. Pfizer’s capacity plans were unknown. The most dramatic competitive revelation came at the annual RSNA meeting in December 1975, when six new competitors displayed CT scanners. Although none of the newcomers offered immediate delivery, all were booking orders with delivery dates up to 12 months out on the basis of their spec sheets and prototype or mock-up equipment exhibits. Some of the new entrants (Syntex, Artronix, and Neuroscan) were smaller companies, but others (General Electric, Picker, and Varian) were major medical electronics competitors. Perhaps most impressive was the General Electric CT/T scanner, which took the infant technology into its third generation (see exhibit 10.6). By using a 30 °-wide pulsed fan X-ray beam, the GE scanner could avoid the time-consuming â€Å"translate-rotate† sequence of the firstand second-generation scanners. A single continuous 360 ° sweep could be completed in 4.8 seconds, and the resulting image was reconstructed by the computer in a 320 ∞ 320 pixel matrix on a cathode ray tube. The unit was priced at $615,000. Clinical trials were scheduled for January, and shipment of production units was being quoted for mid-1976. The arrival of GE on the horizon signaled the beginning of a new competitive game. With a 300-person sales force and a service network of 1,200, GE clearly had marketing muscle. They had reputedly spent $15 million developing their third-generation scanner, and were continuing to spend at a rate of $5 million annually to keep ahead technologically. During 1975, one industry source estimated, about 150 new scanners were installed in the US, and more than twice as many orders entered. (Orders were firm, since most were secured with hefty front-end deposits.) Overall, orders were split fairly evenly between brain and body scanners. EMI was thought to have accounted for more than 50 percent of orders taken in 1975, ON for almost 30 percent. Market size and growth Accurate assessments of market size, growth rate, and competitors’ shares were difficult to obtain. The following represents a sample of the widely varying forecasts made in late 1975: †¢ Wall Street was clearly enamored with the industry prospects (Technicare’s stock price rose from 5 to 22 in six months) and analysts were predicting an annual market potential of $500 million to $1 billion by 1980. †¢ Frost and Sullivan, however, saw a US market of only $120 million by 1980, with ten years of cumulative sales only reaching $1 billion by 1984 (2,500  units at $400,000). †¢ Some leading radiologists suggested that CT scanners could be standard equipment in all short-term hospitals with 200 beds or more by 1985. †¢ Technicare’s president, Mr R. T. Grimm, forecast a worldwide market of over $700 million by 1980, of which $400 million would be in the US. †¢ Despite the technical limitations of its first-generation product, Pfizer said it expected to sell more than 1,500 units of its Acta-Scanner over the next five years. Within EMI, market forecasts had changed considerably. By late 1975, the estimate of the US market had been boosted to 350 units a year, of which EMI hoped to retain a 50 percent share. Management was acutely aware of the difficulty of forecasting in such a turbulent environment, however. international expansion New competitors also challenged EMI’s positions in markets outside the US. Siemens, the $7 billion West German company, became ON’s international distributor. The distribution agreement appeared to be one of short-term convenience for both parties, since Siemens acknowledged that it was developing its own CT scanner. Philips, too, had announced its intention to enter the field. Internationally, EMI had maintained its basic strategy of going direct to the national market rather than working through local partners or distributors. Although all European sales had originally been handled out of the UK office, it quickly became evident that local servicing staffs were required in most countries. Soon separate subsidiaries were established in most continental European countries, typically with a couple of salesmen, and three or four servicemen. Elsewhere in the world, salesmen were often attached to EMI’s existing music organization in that country (e.g., in South Africa, Australia, and Latin America). In Japan, however, EMI signed a distribution agreement with Toshiba which, in October 1975, submitted the largest single order to date: a request for 33 scanners. EMI in 1976: Strategy and Challenges emi’s situation in 1976 By 1976 the CT scanner business was evolving rapidly, but, as the results indicated, EMI had done extremely well financially (exhibit 10.5). In reviewing developments since the US market entry, the following was clear: †¢ While smaller competitors had challenged EMI somewhat earlier than might have been expected, none of the big diagnostic imaging companies had brought its scanner to market, even four years after the original EMI scanner announcement. †¢ While technology was evolving rapidly, the expertise of Hounsfield and his CRL group, and the aggressive reinvestment of much of the early profits in R&D, gave EMI a strong technological position. †¢ While market size and growth were highly uncertain, the potential was unquestionably much larger than EMI had forecast in their early plans. †¢ In all, EMI was well established, with a strong and growing sales volume and a good technical reputation. The company was unquestionably the industry leader. Nonetheless, in the light of all the developments, the strategic tasks facing EMI in 1976 differed considerably from those of earlier years. The following paragraphs outline the most important challenges and problems facing the company in this period. strategic priorities EMI’s first sales priority was to protect its existing highly visible and prestigious customer base from competitors. When its second-generation scanner was introduced in mid-1975, EMI promised to upgrade without charge the first-generation equipment already purchased by its established customers. Although each of these 120 upgrades was estimated to cost EMI $60,000 in components and installation costs, the US sales organization felt that the expense was essential to maintain the confidence and good faith of this important core group of customers. To maintain its leadership image, the US company also expanded its service organization substantially. Beginning in early 1976, new regional and district sales and service offices were opened with the objective of providing customers with the best service  in the industry. A typical annual service contract cost the hospital $40,000 per scanner. By year’s end, the company boasted 20 service centers with 150 service engineers – a ratio that represented one serviceman for every two or three machines installed. The sales force by this time had grown to 20, and was much more customer oriented. Another important task was to improve delivery performance. The interval between order and promised delivery had been lengthening; at the same time, promised delivery dates were often missed. By late 1975, it was not unusual for a 6-month promise to convert into a 12- or 15month actual delivery time. Fortunately for EMI, all CT manufacturers were in backorder and were offering extended delivery dates. However, EMI’s poor performance in meeting promised dates was hurting its reputation. The company responded by substantially expanding its production facilities. By mid-1976 there were six manufacturing locations in the UK, yet because of continuing problems with component suppliers, combined capacity for head and body scanners was estimated at less than 20 units a month. Organizational and personnel issues As the US sales organization became increasingly frustrated, they began urging top management to manufacture scanners in North America. Believing that the product had reached the necessary level of maturity, Dr Powell judged that the time was ripe to establish a US plant to handle at least final assembly and test operations. A Northbrook, Illinois site was chosen. Powell had become EMI’s managing director and was more determined than ever to make the new medical electronics business a success. A capable manager was desperately needed to head the business, particularly in view of the rapid developments in the critical North American market. Consequently, Powell was delighted when Normand Provost, who had been his boss at Texas Instruments, contacted him at the Bermuda radiological meeting in March 1975. He was hired with the hope that he could build a stronger, more integrated US company. With the Northbrook plant scheduled to begin operations by mid-1976, Normand Provost began hiring skilled production personnel. A Northbrook product development center was also a vision of Provost’s to allow EMI to draw on US technical expertise and experience in  solid state electronics and data processing, and the company began seeking people with strong technological and scientific backgrounds. Having hired Provost, Dr Powell made several important organizational changes aimed at facilitating the medical electronics business’s growth and development. In the UK, he announced the creation of a separate medical electronics group. This allowed the separate operating companies, EMI Medical Ltd (previously known as the X-Ray Systems Division), Pantak (EMI) Ltd, SE Labs (EMI) Lt., and EMI Meterflow Ltd, to be grouped together under a single group executive, John Willsher. (See exhibit 10.6.) At last, a more integrated scanner business seemed to be emerging organizationally. The US sales subsidiary was folded into a new company, EMI Medical Inc., but continued to operate as a separate entity. The intention was to develop this company as an integrated diversified medical electronics operation. Jim Gallagher, the general manager of the US operations, was fired and Bob Hagglund became president of EMI Medical Inc. While Gallagher had been an effective salesman, Powell thought the company needed a more rounded general manager in its next phase of expansion. Hagglund, previously executive vice president of G.D. Searle’s diagnostic business, seemed to have the broader background and outlook required to manage a larger integrated operation. He reported through Provost back to Dr Powell in the UK. While Provost’s initial assignment was to establish the new manufacturing and research facilities in the US, it was widely assumed within EMI that he was being groomed to take responsibility for the company’s medical electronics businesses worldwid e. However, in April 1976, while visiting London to discuss progress, Provost died of a heart attack. As a result, the US and UK organizations reported separately to Dr Powell. product diversification Since EMI wished to use the scanner as a means to become a major force in medical electronics, Powell argued that some bold external moves were needed to protect the company’s leadership position. In March 1976, EMI acquired for $2 million ( £1.1 million) SHM Nuclear Corporation, a California-based company that had developed linear accelerators for cancer therapy and  computerized radiotherapy planning systems. Although the SHM product line needed substantial further development, the hope was that linking such systems to the CT scanner would permit a synchronized location and treatment of cancer. Six months later EMI paid  £6.5 million to acquire an additional 60 percent of Nuclear Enterprises Ltd, an Edinburgh-based supplier of ultrasound equipment. In the 1976 annual report, Sir John Read, now EMI’s chairman, reaffirmed his support for Dr Powell’s strategy: We have every reason to believe that this new grouping of scientific and technological resources will prove of national benefit in securing a growing share of worldwide markets for high-technology products†¦ Future Prospects At the close of 1976, EMI’s medical electronics business was exceeding all expectations. In just three years, sales of electronics products had risen from  £84 million to  £207 million; a large part of this increase was due to the scanner. Even more impressive, profits of the electronics line had risen from  £5.2 million in 1972/73 to  £26.4 million in 1975/76, jumping from 16 to 40 percent of the corporate total. Rather than dwindling, interest in scanners seemed to be increasing. Although the company had sold around 450 scanners over the past three years (over 300 in the US alone), its order backlog was estimated to be 300 units. At the December 1976 RSNA meeting, 120 of the 280 papers presented were related to CT scanning. As he reviewed the medical electronics business he had built, Dr Powell was generally pleased with the way in which the company had met the challenges of being a pioneer in a new industry segment. However, there were several developments that he felt would need considerable attention over the next few years. First, Powell felt that competitive activity would continue to present a challenge; second, some changes in the US regulatory environment concerned him; and finally, he was aware that the recent organization changes had created some strains. competitive problems By the end of 1976, EMI had delivered 450 of the 650-odd scanners installed worldwide, yet its market share had dropped to 56 percent in 1975/76 (198 of 352 scanners sold that June-to-June period were EMI’s). The company gained some consolation from the fact that despite their premium pricing strategy and their delivery problems, they had conceded less than half the total market to the combined competitive field. They also felt some sense of security in the 300 orders they held awaiting delivery. Nonetheless, Sir John Read was clearly concerned: [We are well aware of the developing competition. Our research program is being fully sustained to ensure our continued leadership†¦ In mid-1976, the company announced its intention â€Å"to protect its inventions and assert its patent strength,† and subsequently filed suit against Ohio Nuclear claiming patent infringement. However, at the same time, EMI issued a statement proclaiming that â€Å"it was the company’s wish to make its pioneering scanner patents available to all under suitable licensing arrangements.† At the annual RSNA meeting in December 1976, sixteen competitors exhibited scanners. The year’s new entrants (including CGR, the French X-ray giant; Hitachi from Japan; and G.D. Searle, the US drug and hospital equipment company) were not yet making deliveries, however. The industry’s potential production capacity was now estimated to be over 900 units annually. GE’s much-publicized entry was already six months behind their announced delivery date, but it was strongly rumored that production shipments of GE’s third-generation scanner were about to begin. EMI Medical Inc. awaited that event with some trepidation. (A summary of major competitors and their situations as of 1976 is presented in table 10.2.) Regulatory problems By mid-1976 there were indications that government might try to exert a tighter control over hospital spending in general, and purchase of CT scanners in particular. The rapidly escalating cost of healthcare had been a political issue for years, and the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 required states to control the development of costly  or unnecessary health services through a mechanism known as the Certificate of Need (CON) procedure. If they wished to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursements, healthcare facilities were required to submit documentation to their state’s department of health to justify major capital expenditures (typically in excess of $100,000). Before 1976, the CON procedures had generally been merely an administrative impediment to the process of selling a scanner, delaying but not preventing the authorization of funds. However, by 1976, the cost of medical care represented 8 percent of the gross national product and Jimmy Carter made control of the â€Å"skyrocketing costs of healthcare† a major campaign issue. One of the most frequently cited examples of waste was the proliferation of CT scanners. It was argued that this $500,000 device had become a symbol of prestige and sophistication in the medical community, so that every institution wanted its own scanner, even if a neighboring facility had one that was grossly underutilized. In response to heightened public awareness of the issue, five states declared a moratorium on the purchase of new scanners, including California, which had accounted for over 20 percent of total US scanner placements to date. In November, Jimmy Carter was elected president. organizational problems Perhaps most troublesome to Dr Powell were the organizational problems. Tensions within the EMI organization had been developing for some time, centering on the issues of manufacturing and product design. Managers in the US company felt that they had little control over manufacturing schedules and little input into product design, despite the fact that they were responsible for 80 percent of corporate scanner sales. In their view, the company’s current market position was being eroded by the worsening manufacturing delivery performance from the UK, while its longer-term prospects were threatened by the competitive challenges to EMI’s technological leadership. Although the Northbrook plant had been completed in late 1976, US managers were still not satisfied they had the necessary control over production. Arguing that the quality of subassemblies and components shipped from the UK was deteriorating and delivery promises were becoming even more unreliable,  they began investigating alternate supply sources in the US. UK-based manufacturing managers felt that much of the responsibility for backlogs lay with the product engineers and the sales organizations. Their unreliable sales forecasts and constantly changing design specifications had severely disrupted production schedules. The worst bottlenecks involved outside suppliers and subcontractors that were unable to gear up and down overnight. Complete systems could be held up for weeks or months awaiting a single simple component. As the Northbrook plant became increasingly independent, US managers sensed that the UK plants felt less responsibility for them. In tight supply situations they felt there was a tendency to ship to European or other export customers first. Some US managers also believed that components were increasingly shipped from UK plants without the same rigid final checks they normally received. The assumption was that the US could do their own QC checking, it was asserted. Both these assertions were strongly denied by the English group. Nonetheless, Bob Hagglund soon began urging Dr Powell to let EMI Medical Inc. become a more independent manufacturing operation rather than simply a final assembly plant for UK components. This prospect disturbed John Willsher, managing director of EMI Medical Ltd,  who argued that dividing manufacturing operations could mean duplicating overhead and spreading existing expertise too thin. Others felt that the â€Å"bootleg development† of alternate supply sources showed a disrespect for the â€Å"center of excellence† concept, and could easily compromise the ability of Pantak (X-ray technology) and SE Labs (displays) to remain at the forefront of technology. Product development issues also created some organizational tension. The US sales organization knew that GE’s impressive new third-generation â€Å"fan beam† scanner would soon be ready for delivery, and found customers hesitant to commit to EMI’s new CT 5005 until the GE product came out. For months telexes had been flowing from Northbrook to EMI’s Central Research Laboratories asking if drastic reductions in scan time might be possible to meet the GE threat. Meanwhile, scientists at CRL felt that US CT competition was developing into a specifications war based on the wrong issue, scan time. Shorter elapsed times meant less image blurring, but in the trade-off between scan time and picture resolution, EMI engineers had preferred to concentrate on better-quality images. They felt that the 20-second scan offered by EMI scanners made practical sense since a patient could typically hold his breath that long while being diagnosed. CRL staff were exploring some entirely new imaging concepts and hoped to have a completely new scanning technology ready to market in three or four years. Dr Hounsfield had conducted experiments with the fan beam concept in the early 1970s and was skeptical of its ability to produce good-quality images. To use sodium iodide detectors similar to those in existing scanners would be cost prohibitive in the large numbers necessary to pick up a broad scan; to use other materials such as xenon gas would lead to quality and stability problems, in Hounsfield’s view. Since GE and others offering third-generation equipment had not yet delivered commercial machines, he felt little incentive to redirect his staff to these areas already researched and rejected. There were many other demands on the time and attention of Hounsfield and his staff, all of which seemed important for the company. They were in constant demand by technicians to deal with major problems that arose that nobody else could solve. Sales people wanted him to talk to their largest and most prestigious customers, since a visit by Dr Hounsfield could often swing an important sale. They were also involved in internal training on all new products. The scientific community wanted them to present papers and give lectures. And increasingly, Dr Hounsfield found himself in a public relations role as he accepted honors from all over the globe. The impact was to greatly enhance EMI’s reputation and to reinforce its image as the leader in the field. When it appeared that CRL was unwilling or unable to make the product changes  the US organization felt it needed, Hagglund made the bold proposal that the newly established research laboratories in Northbrook take responsibility for developing a three- to five-second-scan â€Å"fan beam†-type scanner. Dr Powell agreed to study the suggestion, but was finding it difficult to evaluate the relative merits of the US subsidiary’s views and the CRL scientists’ opinions. By year’s end, Dr Powell had still been unable to find anybody to take charge of the worldwide medical electronics business. By default, the main decision-making forum became the Medical Group Review Committee (MGRC), a group of key line and staff managers which met, monthly at first, to help establish and review strategic decisions. Among the issues discussed by this committee were the manufacturing and product development decisions that had produced tensions between the US and UK managers. P owell had hoped that the MGRC would help build communications and consensus among his managers, but it soon became evident that this goal was unrealistic. In the words of one manager close to the events: The problem was there was no mutual respect between managers with similar responsibilities. Medical Ltd was resentful of Medical Inc.’s push for greater independence, and were not going to go out of their way to help the Americans succeed. As the business grew larger and more complex, Dr Powell’s ability to act both as corporate CEO and head of the worldwide medical business diminished. Increasingly, he was forced to rely on the MGRC to address operating problems as well as strategic issues. The coordination problem became so complex that, by early 1977, there were four subcommittees of the MGRC, each with representatives of the US and UK organizations, and each meeting monthly on one side of the Atlantic or the other. Committees included Manufacturing and Operations, Product Planning and Resources, Marketing and Sales Programs, and Service and Spares. powell’s problems As the new year opened, Dr Powell reviewed EMI’s medical electronics business. How well was it positioned? Where were the major threats and opportunities? What were the key issues he should deal with in 1977? Which should he tackle first, and how? These were the issues he turned over in his  mind as he prepared to note down his plans for 1977. Assistant Professor Christopher A. Bartlett prepared this case as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Information was obtained from public sources and third parties. Although employees of the subject company discussed with the researcher events referred to in the case, they did not participate in the preparation of the document. The analysis, conclusions, and opinions stated do not necessarily represent those of the company, its employees or agents, or employees or agents of its subsidiaries. Thorn EMI PLC, on its own behalf and on behalf of all or any of its present or former subsidiaries, disclaims any responsibility for the matters included or referred to in the study.